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  In 1982, the French socialist government lead by Pierre Mauroy reduced the legal age of 
retirement for both men and women. In 1993, the Balladur reform modified the pay-as-you-go basic 
private scheme. In March 1997, the Parliament enacted the Thomas Act that introduced retirement 
savings plan, but the law was never enforced because of the political change in June 1997, and was 
formally abrogated in 2002. 
 
  Amazingly there seems be a 10 years cycle in French pension system reforms since the French 
parliament started to examine a new pension reform presented by the French Prime minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin in June 2003. According to his defender, the project is the most comprehensive and the 
most  ambitious  since  1945.  Our  assessment  is  more  critical:  in  fact,  after  a  four-month  round  of 
negotiations with trade-unions and despite its impressive number of articles (81) the final project is 
milder than it originally was, with a parametric reform of the first pillar as its main component. This article 
aims at giving the main features of this reform. The first section presents the context of the reform. The 
second section is devoted to the main features of the reform, while section 3 gives a critical appraisal, 




  En 1982, le gouvernement socialiste conduit par Pierre Mauroy réduisait l'âge légal de départ 
en retraite. En 1993, la réforme Balladur modifiait un certain nombre de paramètres du régime général 
de retraite par répartition. En mars 1997, le Parlement adoptait la loi Thomas introduisant des plans 
d'épargne retraite, mais la restait lettre morte faute de décret d'application, pour être formellement 
abrogée en 2002. 
 
  Il semble ainsi exister un cycle de 10 ans dans les réformes des systèmes de retraites en 
France, puisque le Parlement a commencé à examiner un projet de loi de réformes des retraites en juin 
2003. Selon son promoteur, le projet est le plus vaste et le plus ambitieux depuis la fin de la deuxième 
guerre  mondiale.  Notre  évaluation  est  plus  mitigée:  malgré  de  longues  négociations  et  un  texte 
comportant un nombre impressionnant d'articles (81), le projet final est moins audacieux qu'initialement. 
Cet article entend donner les grands traits de la réforme. La première section en présente le contexte, la 
deuxième les traits principaux, tandis que la troisième en donne une évaluation critique, souligne les 
problèmes rémanents et suggère d'autres pistes de réformes. 
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  In 1982, the French socialist government lead by Pierre Mauroy reduced the legal age of 
retirement for both men and women: since then men and women must be 60 years old to be eligible to 
full pension benefits. In 1993, the Balladur reform modified the pay-as-you-go basic private scheme: the 
contributory period was raised from 37,5 years to 40 years to get full benefits and the reference wage 
used to determine the pension benefits was modified to be computed on the best 25 years of career 
(instead of the best 10 years previously). In March 1997, the Parliament enacted the Thomas Act that 
introduced retirement savings plan, but the law was never enforced because of the political change in 
June 1997, and was formally abrogated in 2002. 
 
  Amazingly there seems be a 10 years cycle in French pension system reforms since the French 
parliament started to examine a new pension reform presented by the French Prime minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin in June 2003. According to his defender, the project is the most comprehensive and the 
most  ambitious  since  1945.  Our  assessment  is  more  critical:  in  fact,  after  a  four-month  round  of 
negotiations with trade-unions and despite its impressive number of articles (81) the final project is 
milder than it originally was, with a parametric reform of the first pillar as its main component. This article 
aims at giving the main features of this reform. The first section presents the context of the reform. The 
second section is devoted to the main features of the reform, while section 3 gives a critical appraisal, 
underlines the remaining problems, and raises alternative relevant solutions. 
 
1.  The demographic, economic, financial and institutional context of the French pension 
reform 
 
According to demographic projections of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques  and  the  Conseil  d'Orientation  des  Retraites,  the  next  half-century  will  witness  major 
changes in demographic trends: 
-  Population growth will progressively slow down: +0.32 % average annual growth in 2001-2020, 
followed by a +0.13% average in 2021-2040. 
-  Population aged 60 and over will dramatically increase between 2005 and 2030, and the old-
age dependency ratio will double over the same period. 
-  Oldest-age dependency ratio, measured by the number of people aged 85 and over relative to 
the number aged 60 and over, will experience a tremendous boom, due to the increase in life-
expectancy at oldest ages. In 2000, the number of people aged 85 and over relative to the 
number aged 60 to 84 was 11.7, and it will reach 27,3 in 2050. 
-  As a consequence, the average age of people over 60 which is 72,4 years in 2003, will be 75,5 
in 2050. 
 
How does France compare to other European countries? First of all, the French instantaneous 
fertility rate (1.81) is above the European average, and well above the Italian (1.29) and German (1.35) 
rates. Secondly, the old-age dependency ratios, measured by the number of people aged 65 and over 
relative to the number aged between 20 and 64, are comprised between 27% and 30% for France, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden in 2003. In 2050, they will reach 70% in Italy, 57% in France, and 45% in 
Sweden. Consequently, the French demography is less unfavourable than the one faced by its major 
neighbours. 
 
Turning to active population, the Raffarin reform bets on a low unemployment rate for the fifty 
coming years. According to the Charpin Report (1999) and to the Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites 
(2002), a 6 % unemployment rate is considered as a plausible assumption, which is optimistic when 







































6  3 
employment rate, especially for older workers. The average age for entering the labour market was 18.6 
in 1968 and 21.7 in 2002; the average ages for leaving the labour market were respectively 65 in 1968 
and 59.3 in 2002. The consequence is a sharp decrease in the life-cycle working period, due to a longer 
period of education, a decrease in the legal retirement age in 1982, and the development of pre-
retirement schemes in the 1980s. 
 
According to the French government, these demographic and economic projections question 
the financial sustainability of the French pension system. If no reform were adopted, the expected deficit 
of aggregate pension regimes would amount to 50 billion of euros in 2020, representing 2 percentage 
points of annual GDP. 
 
The French pension system has two main institutional characteristics: it relies on a pay-as-you-
go basis for its first two pillars (basic general scheme and complementary compulsory schemes); and 
the  first  pillar  is  a  heterogeneous  collection  of  more  than  a  hundred  peculiar  first-pillar  retirement 
schemes introduced since 1945, with different techniques to acquire pension rights and to compute 
pensions,  and  different  contribution  periods  (Lavigne,  2003).  This  complexity  partly  explains  the 
recurrent difficulties in reforming the pension system in France. 
 
 
2.  The main features of the Raffarin reform 
 
The main final objective of the Raffarin reform is to preserve the pay-as-you-go basis of the 
French pension system. A second and marginal in terms of law articles (4 out of 81 articles) objective is 
to promote funding in the third pillar. To reach the main final objective, the project aims at guarantying 
the financial sustainability of the pay-as-you-go pension system, through three intermediate targets: 
increasing labour force participation to ensure a high level of pensions; restoring the equality between 
the public and private schemes; introducing flexibility and degrees of freedom in the retirement choice. 
The main instruments are actuarially neutral incentives for the acquisition of pension rights and fiscal 
incentives for the funding side of the reform. 
 
2.1 Increase in labour force participation  
 
The French government has targeted an average level of pension equal to two thirds of the 
labour income for 2020, and a minimum level of pension equal to 85% of the net minimum wage for a 
full career. To meet the first target, an increase in labour force participation and a longer contributory 
period are fostered.  
 
  The most significant innovation in the Raffarin reform is the introduction incentives to increase 
labour force participation at older ages, both for employers and employees. 
-  Stabilizing the ratio of expected retirement period relative to contribution period 
 
A  new  special committee (Commission  de  garantie des  retraites)  is created  to  assess  the 
evolution of demographic, economic and financial conditions and this committee has to deliver a report 
before the end of 2007. Unless the report indicates that the labour force participation of workers over 50 
has significantly increased, or that the financial sustainability of pension schemes is not threatened, the 
contribution period  will be increased by one quarter every year  to take into account the  expected 
increase of life expectancy at the age of 60, starting from 2009. In 2012, the contribution period will thus 
be equal to 41 years and, if the Commission de garantie des retraites and the Conseil d'Orientation des 
Retraites estimate that the ratio of expected retirement period to contribution period has excessively 
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-  Introducing a bonus for longer periods of contribution and a penalty for shorter periods of 
contribution 
 
The Raffarin reform introduces a bonus of pension for a marginal quarter of contribution above 
160 quarters both for private sector workers and civil servants. The amount of bonus will determined in 
a further decree but is expected to be equal to 0.75% per marginal quarter (i.e. 3% pension bonus per 
marginal year). Symmetrically, the same penalty will be imposed on early retirement (i.e. retirement for 
those who have not contributed during 40 years) for private sector workers and civil servants. This 
penalty already exists for workers of the private sector, amounts to 10% per missing contributory year, 
and will be progressively reduced to be equal to 5% in 2013. This 5% penalty will be applied to civil 
servants starting in 2006, with an upper limit of 25%. No penalty will be charged for workers reaching 
the age of 65, whatever the length of their contributory period. 
 
-  Imposing constraints on redundancies of older workers 
 
At the age of 60, an employee who has contributed during 160 quarters can be dismissed by 
his/her employer without redundancy indemnities. The project imposes that, even if the employee is 
eligible for pension at the age of 60, the employer cannot dismiss the employee before his/her 65th 
birthday if he/she is willing to stay in the job unless paying him/her redundancy indemnities. 
 
-  Limiting pre-retirement schemes to physically demanding jobs and restructuring firms 
 
In the 1980s, many pre-retirement schemes have been set up by the successive governments. 
Basically, employers have fiscal and contributory incentives when they offer a pre-retirement scheme to 
their senior workers. The Raffarin reform aims at limiting fiscal incentives for pre-retirement schemes to 
two  situations.  The  first  one  concerns  physically  demanding  jobs,  the  second  one  applies  to 
restructuring firms in financial distress. Otherwise the employer has to contribute at a special dissuasive 
rate (23.85%), the contributions being accumulated in the pension reserve fund (see below). 
 
-  Enabling workers to continue to work while drawing pension 
 
Progressive  retirement  is  encouraged  through  the  possibility  of  pursuing  working  activities 
(especially part-time jobs) while drawing pension. This possibility enables older workers to cumulate 
pension and new rights to pension. 
 
2.2 Reducing inequalities among contributors and pensioners 
 
Equal treatment of contributors whatever their occupation or their affiliation to a specific pension 
scheme is guaranteed by the pension reform.  
 
-  Convergence of private and public schemes 
 
Since the Balladur reform enacted in 1993, workers in the private sector have to contribute 
during  40  years  to  be  entitled  to  full  pension  benefits.  The  Raffarin  reform  progressively  sets  the 
contribution period equal to 40 years for the civil servants, instead of 37.5 years, until 2008. Also, for 
both private and public schemes, the pension will be proportional to the number of years of contribution: 
 
















































6  5 
where d  denotes the number of quarters of contribution,  r w  the reference wage, and   is a parameter 
positively  related  with  d   and  with  the  age  at  pension  liquidation.   Moreover  the  Raffarin  reform 
introduces a clear rule of indexation of reference wages and pensions on prices.  But there remain 
differences across private and public schemes. On the one hand, the reference wage is an average of 
the best 25 years of career in the private scheme and the average of the last six month (premiums 
excluded) in the public scheme1. On the other hand, the parameter   is equal at most to 50% in the first 
pillar private scheme and 75% in the public one (for full careers).  
 
-  Early vs. late labour-market entry  
 
In order to take into account early labour-market entry (between 14 and 16 years old), the 
Raffarin reform enables workers who have contributed during a sufficient number of quarters (to be 
determined by a further decree) to be eligible to retirement starting from 56 years old (instead of 60). 
Symmetrically workers having completed university degrees will be enable to validate at most 3 years of 
studies as contributory years. This arrangement is designed to take into account late labour-market 
entry for highly skilled workers. Also all workers will be entitled to "buy back" at most 3 contributory 
years, i.e. to contribute on their current wage with no age limit even if they have not sufficiently worked 
to get pension rights at some periods of their career. This arrangement aims at taking into account 
disrupted careers. 
 
-  multiple pension holders and self-employed 
 
Due to the existence of more than a hundred different pension schemes in France, some 
workers derive their pension rights from several regimes if they change job or position in their career. 
Under the current legislation this situation may be prejudicial to  multiple-schemes affiliated workers 
since the computation of the reference wage is based on the best 25 contributory years in each scheme. 
The Raffarin reform homogenises the treatment of single and multiple pension holders. It also creates a 
compulsory complementary pension schemes for self-employed workers and professionals. 
 
-  Survival benefits and family-related arrangements 
 
Under the current legislation survivors benefits and family-related arrangements are unequal 
with respect to gender and occupational status (wage-earners, self-employed and civil servants).  To be 
entitled to survivor's benefits a widow must meet a series of legal requirements: being aged 55 and over, 
earning an income under the minimum wage, having being married at least two years and not being 
remarried. The Raffarin reform improves the situation of surviving spouses by treating men, women and 
occupational  status  equally  and  by  simplifying  the  survivor's  benefits  arrangements.  All  the  limits 
imposed on the surviving spouse are suppressed except the income limit which will take into account the 
new matrimonial situation. 
 
Male and female civil servants will be treated equally as far as their credit for time raising 
children is concerned. Under the current legislation, a bonus of one contributory year per child is granted 
for women (that is women having contributed for 38 years and raised two children are eligible for full 
pension). The Raffarin reform introduces a contributory bonus of at most 3 years for child raising both for 
women and men if the parent takes a special leave for child raising. This arrangement will be enforced 
for children born or adopted starting from 2004. 
 
                                                 
1 When first presented to the trade unions, the project set the reference wage on the last three years of career 







































6  6 
2.3 Introducing funding  
 
The last part of the pension reform is devoted to third pillar pensions even if the word “pension 
fund” is never mentioned. It creates a new individual retirement savings product (plan d’épargne pour la 
retraite) subscribed individually or on an occupational basis. The management of funds will be operated 
by an associative structure in order to secure the invested funds. This retirement savings product will 
serve annuities as soon as the contributor is eligible for the first pillar pension. The fiscal incentive is 
based on the deduction of contributions from disposable income under a ceiling to be determined by a 
further decree. Moreover tax treatment of all existing retirement savings devices will be treated equally. 
The  Plan  Partenarial    d’épargne  salariale  volontaire  created  in  February  2001  by  the  preceding 
government is transformed in an explicit retirement saving plan which means that the invested sums will 
be converted in annuities or capital only when the affiliated is eligible to the first pillar pension (instead of 
a minimum 10-years investment under the current legislation, see Lavigne, 2003). 
 
3  Critical appraisal, remaining problems and alternative solutions 
 
This section gives a critical appraisal of the Raffarin reform2 underlying the remaining issues 
and the alternative solutions that could have been adopted. 
 
3.1 Method and content: much ado about nothing? 
 
The Raffarin reform has been criticised on two grounds. First of all, the social partners felt 
dissatisfied by Raffarin’s method. When the Prime minister first announced his reform in February 2003, 
trade-unions and social partners expected an open and in-depth negotiation. They have been frustrated 
by their limited ability to amend the initial text which has rapidly leaded to a political struggle and 
massive strikes in the public sector (civil servants and other special schemes which are not concerned 
by the on-going reform). 
 
Moreover despite its impressive length, the French pension reform project is not so ambitious, 
comprehensive and innovative as the Prime minister pretends it to be. Contrary to other  European 
reforms, the Raffarin reform has not explicitly introduced notional accounts in the first pillar even if the 
notion of actuarial neutrality is present in two devices (the bonus/penalty of  pension accruals with 
respect  to  extended/shortened  contributory period  and  the  increase  in  the  contributory period  with 
respect to life expectancy increases). But the reform is limited to the first-pillar main schemes (general 
basic scheme covering about 60% wage-earners, civil servants schemes, self-employed schemes and 
farmers  schemes)  leaving  aside  about  several  dozens  of  special  schemes  (railways  monopoly, 
electricity monopoly, Banque de France…). It is a parametric reform that plays on the sole parameter of 
contributory  period,  leaving  unchanged  the  legal  retirement  age,  the  contribution  rates,  and  the 
replacement rates3. Besides, the second pillar which relies on  two main compulsory complementary 
pay-as-you-go occupational schemes has not been modified at all despite its obvious flaws. 
 
There is also a contradiction between  the necessary  budget deficit cutting imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact  and the incentives given to increase labour force participation   (see for 
example, the incentives given to civil servants to get part-time job at old ages or to stay longer in their 
jobs). Besides, the possibility of buying back contributory periods clearly gives disincentives to stay in 
the labour market at old ages. 
 
                                                 
2  This article has been completed on June 30th while the project was still discussed at the Assemblée nationale and had to 
be discussed at the Sénat which means that the project under review is subject to amendments. 
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3.2 The burning issue of the special schemes 
 
Notwithstanding the flaunted willingness to reduce inequalities among contributors, there still 
remains an unequal treatment of income-earners. Many special retirement schemes have not been 
affected by the current reform, and if the law is literally interpreted, these schemes have to be reformed 
in a near future. And even if the civil servants pension scheme has the same contributory period as in 
the basic general scheme, there remain differences in reference wages and replacement ratios. 
 
3.3 Alternative solutions 
 
There is a slight hypocrisy in saying that the legal retirement age is not, and will not be, 
modified since the contributory period necessary to be eligible to full pension will increase along with life 
expectancy.  The  Raffarin  reform  by  itself  also  keeps  unchanged  the  contribution  rates  and  the 
replacement rates which could have been used as a “parametric mix” of solutions.  
  
The main difference between the French pension reform and other European reform is the 
marginal use of funding in public pension financing. As was mentioned above, the second pillar functions 
on a pay-as-you-go basis and the project is very allusive on the new retirement savings plans. There is a 
real taboo on pension funds in France, at least on the trade-unions side that has been reinforced by the 
Enron and WorldCom affairs. Nevertheless funding could have been instilled through the active use of 
the public pension reserve fund that has been created in 1999. This reserve fund could have been 
abounded by a special contribution on employers and employees. Some rough estimates suggest that 
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